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Abstract
Considering that people can invest in their health-related quality of life, we investigate
the eects of public policies (the investment subsidy policy and the direct transfer of
investment commodities) on the health-related quality of life in the small open economy.
Our main ndings are that a temporary increase in these public policies conducted by
the domestic government does not have positive impacts on the health-related quality of
life in the long run; and alternatively, the foreign aid in the form of direct transfer of
investment commodities improves their health.
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1 Introduction
It has been known that rising longevity has positive eects on the growth rate because
expecting a higher chance of surviving leads to more saving for old-age consumption and
the investment in education. For instance, Bhargava et al. (2001) show signicant eects of
adult survival rate on economic growth rates for low income countries. The similar results are
given in many empirical researches (e.g., Zhang and Zhang 2005, Ehrlich and Lui 1991, Barro
and Sala-i-Martin 1995, Bloom et al. 2003), which means that extending life expectancy is
an important factor for developing countries to escape serious poverty. As a result, these
ndings continue to motivate a lot of researchers to examine how public policies lead to a
longer life expectancy in developing countries; however, until now, we have not found the
stylized policies.
Some studies have found that the health-related public spending does not yield the de-
sirable improvement for health, especially in developing countries. For instance, Musgrove
(1996) and Filmer and Pritchett (1999) conclude that the health-related public spending does
not have any impact on health, with a coecient that is statistically insignicant at conven-
tional levels. Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) show that the health-related public spending
lowers child mortality rates in countries with good governance; however, in poorly governed,
developing countries, increasing public spending on health does not lead to better outcomes.
Anand and Ravallion (1993) and Bidani and Ravallion (1997) conrm limited impacts of
public spending for the poor at the micro level; however, their ndings are still consistent
with small and insignicant impacts of its spending on aggregate health status. Similarly,
World Development Report (World Bank, 2004) mentions that the relationship between pub-
lic expenditure on health and the state of health is not seen at the statistically signicant
level. These ndings have led to doubts regarding the role of health-related public spending.
There is a health-related paradox between domestic policies and foreign aid. Mishra and
Newhouse (2009) give an interesting nding, which is that increased health aid from foreign
countries is associated with a statistically signicant reduction in infant and child mortality.1
1To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper which examines the eects of foreign aid on health, except
for Mishra and Newhouse (2009). In that regard, Mishra and Newhouse (2009) also mention despite the vast
empirical literature considering the eect of foreign aid on growth, the existing paper that aid improves health
outcomes is scare.
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Based on their paper, a possible reason why the expected eect on health is yielded by foreign
aid is that foreign aid relaxes government budget constraint. In other words, when foreign
aid is conducted, the domestic government does not need to budget for health spending.
In developing countries with serious poverty, the health-related policies have a large im-
pact not only on these countries' aggregate health degrees but also their whole economies.
Hence, in this paper, to give a solution for the above paradox, we construct a dynamic general
equilibrium model of a small open economy with a health status variable. As for the health
status variable, we assume the following. First, the health degrees of agents are incorporated
into their utility, which quanties a health-related quality of life mentioned in Sen (1981),
Torrance (1986), Gordon et al. (1993) and Dolan (2000). In other words, we assume that
when the level of health-related quality of life increases, their utility level increases as well.
Second, the health status variable, represented by the health-related quality of life, is evolved
over time. Concretely, increasing the private investment in health derives a higher level of
health-related quality of life and increases the level of utility, but increased labor harms the
state of health and decreases the level of utility. Under this set-up, the purpose of this paper
is to examine the dynamic impacts of the temporary change in health-related public instru-
ments on the health-related quality of life as well as on the domestic economy. The reason
why we shed light on the temporary execution is that the government budget of health-related
policies will be replaced by other policies during the economic development. This is because
as people become richer, the private spending for health increases. Specically, we introduce
two forms of health-related policies: a direct transfer and a subsidy of health investment.
Furthermore, to shed light on this nding, we add a direct transfer of health investment in
the form of foreign aid. Our main nding is that the temporary enforcement of health-related
policies controlled by domestic government does not improve the health-related quality of life;
and alternatively, foreign aid improves it in the long run.
Our study is closely related to some of the existing investigations in the dynamic macroe-
conomic models (e.g., Futagami and Shibata 1998, Corneo and Jeanne 1997, Nakamoto 2009,
Momota et al. 2005, Hashimoto and Tabata 2010, Aisa and Pueyo 2013, Chatterjee and
Turnovsky 2007). First, the specication of the utility function with a health status variable
is similar to the wealth or status seeking preference in Futagami and Shibata (1998), Corneo
and Jeanne (1997) and Nakamoto (2009) in the sense that the utility function depends on
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a stock variable. The utility function in their papers depends on capital stock as well as
consumption, implying that people feel happy as the level of wealth accumulates. On the
other hand, our employed utility function depends on the health-related quality of life, not
capital stock, meaning that an improvement of health-related quality of life leads to a higher
level of utility.
Next, in a two-period overlapping-generation model, Hashimoto and Tabata (2010) and
Aisa and Pueyo (2013) introduce health-care goods. That is, when people consume health-
care goods, their level of utility increases. In that regard, as mentioned in their papers,
the health-care good can be regarded as the consumption good. In addition, they do not
introduce any variables which indicate the state of health. In the present paper we suppose
that there is an investment commodity which can improve the health-related quality of life.
In what follows, we need to mention the set-up of a two-period overlapping-generation
model in Momota et al. (2005). In their paper, the prevalence of the diseases is added to
the utility function, which nds that if the competitive equilibrium path is monotonic, the
enforcement of one-shot foreign aid improves the welfare of agents.2 Alternatively, the policy
analysis in our paper is more comprehensive in the following three points. First, we employ
not only the foreign aid but also two kinds of domestic policies. Second, our policies do not
limit one-shot enforcement. In other words, in addition to one-shot policy, we can suppose
that each government policy is temporarily changed. Finally, to see the temporary eects
more comprehensively, we conrm the permanent eects as well.
Finally, Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007) and this paper are similarly motivated by the
role of foreign aid. In detail, Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007) incorporate the elastic labor
supply into the small open economy, and examine the eects of foreign aid on the economic
growth. In our paper, we focus on the eects on the health-related quality of life.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a baseline model.
Section 3 conrms the existence of steady state and stability. Section 4 examines the eects
of a temporary/permanent change in the domestic government policies on the health-related
quality of life and gives numerical examples. Section 5 analyzes the case where the foreign
aid is introduced instead of the domestic government policies, and discusses whether the form
2The main nding in their paper is that the external eect of diseases yields a cyclical competitive-
equilibrium path; on the other hand, we do not consider any external eects with respect to health.
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of utility function aects our main result. Section 6 concludes.
2 Baseline Model
We consider a small open economy where the world interest rate, r, is constant. The popu-
lation is constant and is normalized to unity. We consider a simple neoclassical production
function. Since the aggregate production function is assumed to satisfy constant returns to
scale with respect to capital and labor, which is expressed as:
yt = F (k^t; lt) = ltf(kt);
where yt is output, k^t is capital, lt is labor and kt  k^t=lt denotes capital intensity. The
production function, f(kt), is monotonically increasing, strictly concave in kt and satises
the Inada conditions. Taking account of competitive factor and nal goods markets, the real
rent rt and real wage rate wt are respectively determined by:
r = f 0(kt); wt = f(kt)  ktf 0(kt): (1)
Since the real rent is constant in the small open economy, from (1) we can see that the capital
intensity is constant and hence, the wage rate is xed as well (kt = k and wt = w). As a
result, the production function is given by:
yt = ltf(k): (2)
2.1 Households and Health
We express the degree of health-related quality of life as an index ht 2 R+, and a higher level
of the variable ht means that his health-related quality of life is higher. Then, the lifetime
utility of the representative agent is given by:
U0 
Z 1
0

u(ct) + v(ht)
	
e tdt: (3)
where ct is consumption level at time t and (> 0) is the rate of time preference. In addi-
tion, we assume that the instantaneous utility functions u() and v() are twice continuously
dierentiable, monotonically increasing and strictly concave in each variable ct and ht. In ad-
dition, these functions satisfy the Inada conditions. The specication that the health-related
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variable is incorporated into the utility function is used in many studies (e.g., Aisa and Pueyo
2013, Hashimoto and Tabata 2010, Momota et al. 2005).
In what follows, denoting by lt labor supply, we assume that the degree of health-related
quality of life ht is evolved as follows:
_ht = g(xt + ) G(lt); (4)
where  the policy instrument concerning health. In addition, we assume that g0() > 0,
g00() < 0, G0() > 0, and G00() > 0. As the variable xt, we must rstly notice that the
health-related quality of life ht is dened as a measure of well-being in this paper, which is a
broader concept beyond a direct measure of health such as longevity. For instance, if more
labor deteriorates physical health, the variable xt may be regarded as health-oriented products
such as foods and drinks. When more labor harms mental health, xt can be thought to be an
investment and a consumption goods in improving mental health. In addition, if the health-
related quality of life ht is regarded as a measure of sanitary conditions, working may represent
an aspect of deteriorating sanitation (e.g., waste) and the variable xt represents the hygienic
investment of promoting health such as the proper disposal of waste and sewage.3 Hereafter,
following Momota et al. (2005) we call the variable xt as the (private) health investment.
Hence,  can be regarded as a direct transfer of health investment by the government (or,
foreign aid).
Turning our interests into the budget constraint, we suppose that using the goods pro-
duced by the capital stock, the representative agent has the option of either consumption or
health investment. Then, the accumulation of the foreign asset holding, bt is evolved as:
_bt = rbt + ltf(k)  ct   (1  )xt   zt; (5)
where zt is the lump-sum tax and  is a subsidy rate for health investment.
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In the accumulation equations for health-related quality of life (4) and foreign asset (5),
there are three kinds of policies. First,  represents a constant rate of investment subsidy,
3For instance, since Momota et al. (2005) focused on the prevalence of the diseases, the variable xt is called
as the private health investment to improve water and sanitation systems.
4If the health investment xt is regarded as the health-care goods, the relative price of xt for consumption
goods ct may be needed. However, the incorporation of relative price does not change the main nding in this
paper because the set-up of small open economy makes the relative price xed through time.
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which means that an increase in  decreases the relative price of investment in the health,
and hence, it will further stimulate the investment. Therefore, a higher rate of subsidy for
health investment will lead to a higher level of health-related quality of life ht. Next, 
represents a direct transfer of health investment by domestic government. A larger level of
direct transfer will lead to a higher level of health-related quality of life. As for these policies,
we assume that the domestic government levies lump-sum tax on their budget. Therefore,
the government keeps the following balanced budget over time:
xt +  = zt: (6)
Finally, we consider the foreign aid of direct transfer of health investment. In this case,
the government does not need to impose any tax on the domestic agents and not issue any
national bonds in order to receive the foreign aid. Therefore, the optimization choices of
agents is not restricted by the balanced budget (6).5
2.2 Dynamic system
The representative agent maximizes his lifelong utility (3) subject to the evolution of health-
related quality of life (4) and the budget constraint (5). In order to derive the optimal
conditions, we set the current-value Hamiltonian:
H = u(ct) + v(ht) + t

g(xt + ) G(lt)

+ qt

rbt + ltf(k)  ct   (1  )xt   zt

;
where t and qt are respectively the costate variables for the equations (4) and (5).
Deriving the optimal conditions, we have:
u0(ct) = qt; (7a)
v0(ht) =   _t + t; (7b)
g0(xt + )t = (1  )qt; (7c)
G0(lt)t = qtf(k); (7d)
rqt =   _qt + qt: (7e)
5Momota et al. (2005) and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007) use this form of foreign aid.
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The transversality conditions are given by:
lim
t!1thte
 t = 0; lim
t!1 qtbte
 t = 0:
From (7a) and (7e), the well-known Euler equation for consumption is given by:
_ct
ct
=   u
0(ct)
ctu00(ct)
(r   ): (8)
Assuming that r =  in the small open economy, we see that _ct = 0; that is, ct = c, which
means that u0(c) = qt = q. Next, using (7c), we obtain:
t =
(1  )u0(c)
g0(xt + )
: (9)
Dierentiating (9) with respect to time and then dividing both sides by (9), we have
_t
t
=  g
00(xt + )
g0(xt + )
_xt; (10)
Substituting (7b) and (9) into (10), we can see that:
_xt =   g
0(xt + )
g00(xt + )

r   v
0(ht)g0(xt + )
(1  )u0(c)

: (11)
The equations (7d), (9), and u0(c) = q yield
g0(xt + )f(k)  (1  )G0(lt) = 0: (12)
Using (12), we can express lt as follows:
lt = l(xt; ; ): (13)
Concerning (13), the signs of the partial derivative are
lx  @lt
@xt
=
g00(xt + )f(k)
(1  )G00(lt) < 0; (14a)
l  @lt
@
=
G0(lt)
(1  )G00(lt) > 0; (14b)
l  @lt
@
=
g00(xt + )f(k)
(1  )G00(lt) < 0: (14c)
We must note that lx = lm.
Taking (4) and (13) into consideration, we obtain:
_ht = g(xt + ) G(l(xt; ; )): (15)
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From (6) and (13), the accumulation equation of foreign asset (5) can be rewritten as:
_bt = rbt + l(xt; ; )f(k)  c  xt   : (16)
Therefore, the complete dynamic system is given by (11), (15), and (16) of the small open
economy, given a steady-state level of consumption c, the rate of investment subsidy  and
the direct transfer of health investment .
3 Steady state and stability
Let us now analyze the existence of uniquely determined steady state and its stability. First,
as mentioned in the above, because of the set-up of small open economy, which means that
the rate of interest is xed, we have to require r =  for our system to have a nite interior
steady-state value for the marginal utility of consumption.
Then, we focus on the subsystem (11) and (15). Denoting by asterisk the steady-state
level of each variable, from (11) we show that the _xt = 0 locus is:
g0(x + ) =
r(1  )u0(c)
v0(h)
: (17a)
where the slope of the _xt = 0 locus is given by:
dxt
dht

_xt=0
=   g
0(x + )
g00(x + )
v00(h)
v0(h)
< 0: (17b)
Note that x approaches to innity as h goes to zero, while x approaches to   as h goes
to innity. Then, we can depict a lower right curve as seen in Figure 1.
Turning into the equation _ht = 0, from (15) we can see that
g(x + ) = G(l(x; ; ));
which can be easily conrm that the steady-state level of health investment x is uniquely
determined where as in Figure 1, _ht = 0 is given by a horizontal line. As a result, from Figure
1, we can easily see that there exists a unique steady state.
(Insert Figure 1 here.)
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To examine the stability of the steady state, from (11) and (15) we obtain the linearly
approximated equations: 24 _xt
_ht
35 =
24 J11 J12
J21 J22
3524 xt   x
ht   h
35 ; (18)
where
J11  @ _xt
@xt
=
v0(h)g0(x + )
(1  )u0(c) = r > 0 , J12 
@ _xt
@ht
= r
g0(x + )
g00(x + )
v00(h)
v0(h)
> 0 ,
J21  @
_ht
@xt
= g0(x + ) G0(l)lx > 0 , J22  @
_ht
@ht
= 0 .
Concerning the coecient matrix of (18), we can see that
TrJ = r > 0; DetJ =  r g
0(x + )
g00(x + )
v00(h)
v0(h)

g0(x + ) G0(l)lx
	
< 0: (19)
From (19), the subsystem has the saddle-path stability because the two eigenvalues of the
coecient matrix have opposite sign. Let us denote an eigenvalue by ai (i = 1; 2). Solving
a1 and a2 (a1 < a2), we get
a1 =
1
2

r  
p
r2 + 4J12J21

< 0; a2 =
1
2

r +
p
r2 + 4J12J21

> 0:
Then, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The steady-state equilibrium is uniquely determined and satises the saddle-
path stability.
Next, we turn to the linear approximation of (ht; xt) given by:
ht = h
 +A1ea1t +A2ea2t; (20a)
xt = x
 +1A1ea1t +2A2ea2t; (20b)
where
1  a1
J21
< 0; 2  a2
J21
> 0:
From the transversality conditions, we must notice that A2 = 0. Furthermore, it follows from
(20a) that
A1 = h0   h:
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Thus, the stable adjustment path is given by:
ht = h
 + (h0   h)ea1t; (21a)
xt = x
 +1(h0   h)ea1t: (21b)
Therefore, the phase diagram of the subsystem is illustrated in Figure 2.6
(Insert Figure 2 here.)
We move on to the linearization of (16). The linearized equation is given by
_bt = 
(xt   x) + r(bt   b); 
  f(k)lx   1 < 0: (22)
Solving (22), we have
bt = b
 +

b0   b  (h0   h)
	
ert +(h0   h)ea1t;   
1
a1   r < 0: (23)
Regarding (23), the following equality must hold due to the intertemporal solvency condition
of the economy:
b0   b  (h0   h) = 0: (24)
In this case, (23) yields
bt = b
 +(h0   h)ea1t: (25)
Taking account of _xt = _ht = _bt = 0 with the intertemporal solvency condition, we nd
6From (11), the dynamics of xt become
@ _xt
@ht
= r
g0(xt + )
g00(xt + )
v00(ht)
v0(ht)
> 0:
Thus, _xt > 0 above the _xt = 0 locus, while _xt < 0 below the _xt = 0 locus. From (15), the dynamics of ht are
given by
@ _ht
@xt
= g0(xt + ) G0(lt)lx > 0:
Thus, _ht > 0 above the _ht = 0 locus, while _ht < 0 below the _ht = 0 locus. Thus, through this process, we can
conrm that the phase diagram of the subsystem is illustrated in Figure 2.
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that the steady state is determined by the following expressions:
v0(h)g0(x + ) = r(1  )u0(c); (26a)
g(x + ) G(l(x; ; )) = 0; (26b)
rb + l(x; ; )f(k)  c   x    = 0; (26c)
bT   b = (hT   h): (26d)
where we have to notice that c = c over time.
4 The eects of public policies by domestic government
In this section, we analyze how a change in public policies aects the health-related quality
of life as well as the whole economy. Before proceeding with our analysis, we need to mention
the policy result of the Ramsey paradigm of a closed economy, which is that a temporary
change inuences the economy during the transition; however, after the temporary change is
removed, the economy gradually returns to the original steady state. As a result, it can be
easily presumed that a temporary change of policy instrument in a closed economy does not
have any impact on the long-run level of health-related quality of life. On the other hand,
this paper employs the framework of a small open economy. As a result, even if the public
policy is temporarily changed or conducted, the position of long-run steady state does not
coincide with the original one, implying that the health-related quality of life increases or
decreases. Then, we will show that the public policies conducted by domestic government do
not have positive eects on the health-related quality of life.
4.1 Temporary eects
As the economy develops, the wealth of residents increases, and hence, they will spend more
for their health, which implies that the role of public spending about health will be gradually
restricted. Hence, it would be dicult for the health-related policies to keep the same scale in
the governmental budget permanently. Then, it is more important to focus on the temporary
eects of health-related policies, compared to the permanent eects.
For the small open economy, the rate of interest is exogenously given, so that it must hold
r =  for the economy to go toward the steady state. Hence, from (8) the consumption growth
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rate is zero. That is, the level of consumption is xed over time except for an unanticipated
change in public policies. If public policies unanticipatedly change, the agents in the small
economy will change their consumption behaviors. Concretely, let us consider the case in
which the government unanticipatedly announces a change of the policy instruments from
the original level, 0 (or 0), to a new level 1 (or 1), at time t = 0, the policy is conducted
during some duration t = [0; T ), and hereafter, the policy instruments permanently return
to the original level 0 (or 0) at time t = [T;1]. Then, the consumption behavior of agents
is as follows. At the initial period, because of the unanticipated policy change, the initially
consumption jumps, and hereafter, the level of consumption becomes xed. In particular,
we must notice that even if the policy instrument returns to the original level at time T ,
the level of consumption does not go back to its original level but still remains under the
assumption of perfect foresight. That is, since the agents can initially anticipate the policy
change at time T , so that their levels of consumption do not change at time T . As a result,
the newly level of xed consumption leads to the long-run impact of temporary change in
public policies.
Then, we can show the following main nding.
Proposition 2 A temporary increase in the subsidy rate for the private health investment,  ,
decreases the level of health-related quality of life in the long run. Alternatively, a temporary
increase in the direct transfer of health investment, , does not lead to any changes in the
health-related quality of life.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuitive explanations about each policy are as follows. As for the health-related
investment subsidy, the key element in determining the long-run eects is the behavior of
consumption. An increase in the subsidy rate for the health investment leads to a negative
impact on consumption at the initial period, because the policy decreases the relative price of
health-investment commodities and hence, it causes further investment in health. Therefore,
the direction of the initial jump in consumption is downward, thereby showing that the
growth rate of health investment in (11) is negatively aected over time. Put dierently, the
current health investment is substituted with the future investment, which causes the delay
in the health investment. Finally, considering that only the negative impact on consumption
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remains in the long run, we can argue that there exists the delay in health investment in the
long run. As a result, the long-run level of health-related quality of life decreases.
Now, we conrm the dynamic movement of the economy in Figure 3. Suppose that the
economy is in the original steady state E0 initially. When the government raises  from 0
to 1 at time t = 0 and restores 1 to 0 after t = T , the graph of the _xt = 0 locus rst shifts
upward (from \ _xt = 0 (t = 0)" to \Tem: _xt = 0 (t < T )" in Figure 3 (A)) and then moves
downward (from \Tem: _xt = 0 (t < T )" to \Tem: _xt = 0 (t > T )"). Regarding the _ht = 0
locus, the graph rst shifts upward (from \_ht = 0 (t = 0)" to \Tem: _ht = 0 (t < T )") and
then moves downward (from \Tem: _ht = 0 (t < T )" to \Tem: _ht = 0 (t > T )"). In this
case, the private health investment, xt, rst jumps to \Q
0" on an unstable path, because the
dynamic path needs to ride on the new saddle path at time t = T . Due to this, although
health status rst improves, it is ultimately deteriorated in comparison with health status
in the original steady state. Besides, Figure 3 (B) shows the relationship between ht and bt.
Under a temporary rise in  , the steady-state value of bt ultimately increases.
(Insert Figure 3 here.)
In what follows, we consider the eects of direct transfer of health investment by domestic
government. From (26b), we can see that @x

@ =  1 because lx = l in (13), meaning that the
relationship between the health investment ht and the transfer  is completely substituted.
Since an increase of one unit of direct transfer of health investment causes a decrease of one
unit of private health investment, there is a crowding out eect for health investment. In
summary, due to the substitution of public for private spending, additional public provision
in domestic government has a negligible net marginal eect, which can be seen in a real
economy, as mentioned in Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) and Mishra and Newhose (2009).
Under the complete substitution, even if the direct transfer of health investment temporarily
changes, the economic movement does not change, by which we conclude that the level of
health-related quality of life does not change over time.
4.2 Permanent eects
To understand the temporary eects in the last subsection more comprehensively, let us
examine the permanent eects of public policies. Firstly, we must notice that as conrmed in
14
the last subsection, the direct transfer of health investment in the form of (4) does not have
any impacts on the whole economy due to the crowding out eect. Therefore, this conclusion
is not related to the implementation period, and hence, we focus on the permanent eect of
subsidy policy for the health investment.
Suppose that the subsidy rate  increases permanently. Then, we can see that the shift
of the _xt = 0 locus is as follows:
@xt
@
=  (1  )ru
0(c)
v0(ht)g00(xt)| {z }
+

1
1    
u00(c)
u0(c)
C

: (27)
Since C < 0, the sign of @xt=@ is ambiguous. In the curly brackets of (27), if the eect of
rst term dominates that of second term, we can see that @xt=@ > 0. In other words, when
the subsidy rate  is large enough, this case can be held. Then, as depicted in Figure 3 (A),
the _xt = 0 locus shifts upward by increasing the subsidy rate  . Next, we can see the shift of
the _ht = 0 locus as follows:
@xt
@
=
G0(lt)l
g0(xt) G0(lt)lx > 0; (28)
which leads to an upward movement of the _ht = 0 locus by increasing the subsidy rate  .
Now, let us see the impact of a permanent rise in  in Figure 3 in which our interest is
the upward shift of _xt = 0, because the long-run eect on the health-related quality of life
is the opposite with that obtained by the temporary increase. Suppose that the economy is
in the original steady state E0 initially as in Figure 3 (A). Then, if the government raises
 permanently at time t = 0, the locus of _xt = 0 moves upwardly from \ _xt = 0 (t = 0)"
to \Per: _xt = 0 (t > 0)." Furthermore, since the _ht = 0 locus also shifts upward under a
permanent rise in  , the graph of the _ht = 0 locus moves from \_ht = 0 (t = 0)" to \Per:
_ht = 0 (t > 0)." In this case, the private health investment, xt, rst jumps to \Q" in order
to ride on the new saddle path, and then health status improves along this saddle path. As
a result, the economy reaches the new steady state E1, where health status is better than
the original one. Besides, Figure 3 (B) depicts the relationship between ht and bt. Under a
permanent rise in  , the steady-state value of bt ends up decreasing.
As for the health-related quality of life, the results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the subsidy rate for the health investment is large enough such
as the positive sign of @xt=@ in (27). Then, a permanent rise in the subsidy rate for the
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health investment improves the health-related quality of life in the long run. On the other
hand, when the subsidy rate for the health investment is not large, this result can be reversed.
4.3 Numerical examples
In the section 4.1 and 4.2, we have conrmed the main nding of this paper. While the direct
transfer of health-related investment commodities does not have any impacts on the whole
economy over time, we concluded that a temporary increase in the rate of investment subsidy
decreases the health-related quality of life in the long run and a permanent increase may
improve it. Then, our concern is to see the quantitative impacts of investment subsidy policy
on the health-related quality of life. In addition, we are interested in providing numerical
conrmation of our results in Proposition 2 and furthermore, seeing that Figures 2 and 3 are
mathematically correct.
First, we specify the utility function as the constant-relative-risk-aversion type: u(ct) =
c1 t =(1 ) and v(ht) = h1 t =(1 ) where  and  are preference parameters with positive
signs. In what follows, the production of the single homogeneous commodity is given by
the production process: f(kt) = Ak

t where A and  are the production parameters. While
these types of utility and the production functions are frequently used, we assume that the
functions g() and G() about the health-related quality of life are as follows:
g(xt) =
x1 t
1  ; G(lt) =
l1+t
1 + 
; (29)
where 0 <  < 1 and  > 0.
The parameter values used in our simulations are:
 The production parameters:  = 0:3; A = 0:2:
 Taste parameters:  = 1:5;  = 3:5:
 Health parameters:  = 0:5;  = 0:75:
 Interest rate and tax rate: r = ( =)0:04; 0 = 0; 1 = 0:25:
 Initial values: b0 = 1; h0 = 1:859:
Some of these parameters are standard ones:  = 0:3,  = r = 0:04 and  = 1:5. In that case,
setting A = 0:2 yields the xed value of capital stock, k = 1:78. As for the health parameters,
we assume that the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption is lower than
with respect to the health-related quality of life,  = 3:5, which supposes that the investment
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commodity about health is a luxury good for the poor in the developing countries. Next, we
set the remaining parameters in the functions g() and G() as follows:  = 0:5 and  = 0:75.
Finally, while the original rate of investment subsidy is zero, we assume that its rate is set as
1 = 0:25, which means that the relative price of investment commodities decreases by the
75 percent level.
Figure 4(a) and 4(b) show the quantitative eects of the temporary change in the in-
vestment subsidy. Alternatively, Figure 5(a) and 5(b) give those of permanent change where
we focus on the case where the health-related quality of life increases in the long run. The
labels given in each gure corresponds to that in Figure 3. For example, the label E0 in these
gures represents the original steady state. Then, our ndings are as follows.
First, the dynamic behaviors of health investment, the health-related quality of life and
the foreign asset are qualitatively the same with those in Figure 3. In particular, a temporary
rise in the rate of investment subsidy leads to a decrease in the health-related quality of life
in the long run. Concretely, the long-run level of health-related quality of life at E2 is given
by h = 1:840, which implies that the temporary policy leads to about 1 percent decrease
in the health-related quality of life. This change seems to be a slight shift. This is because
the long-run impact of investment subsidy policy is determined by only the initial jump of
private consumption.
Based on this, the current concern is to see the quantitative change in private consumption
because this change leads to the decrease in the health-related quality of life. Concretely, we
see that c = 0:1980 at the original steady state E0, which leads to a downward jump c =
0:1933, which shows around 2 percent decrease in the consumption. This slight shift causes
a small impact on the health-related quality of life. As a result, since the distance between
h0 and h

2 is very close, the foreign asset does not move dramatically , and furthermore, each
level of foreign asset at E0 and E2 is very close as well as seen in Figure 4(b).
Finally, we turn to the permanent eects of investment subsidy in Figure 5. Based on our
setting, the permanent increase in the rate of investment subsidy improves the health-related
quality of life in the long run. In detail, the 25 percent increase in the rate of investment
subsidy increases to h = 1:886 at E1, which is the 1.5 percent increase in the health-related
quality of life.
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(Insert Figures 4 and 5 here.)
5 Discussion
5.1 The foreign aid
In the last section, we have conrmed the eects of public policies conducted by domestic
government, concluding that these policies negatively aect the health-related quality of life in
the long run. Alternatively, taking account of the real economy, a lot of developing countries
are assisted by foreign countries in various forms. Therefore, our concern is now to examine
the eects of foreign aid on the health-related quality of life. In particular, we focus on the
form of direct transfer of health investment. This is because this type of assistance (e.g.,
transfers of foods and medicines) is broadly observed in foreign aid.7
Let us denote the direct transfer of health commodities in the form of foreign aid as the
variable m. Since residents in the recipient country do not have any tax burden, the budget
constraint can be rewritten as:
_bt = rbt + ltf(k)  ct   xt; (30a)
where the evolution of health-related quality of life is fundamentally the same except for the
notation:
_ht = g(xt +m) G(lt): (30b)
Following the similar analysis in Section 2.2 and Section 3, in the steady state we nd
that
v0(h)g0(x +m) = ru0(c); (31a)
g(x +m) = G(l(x;m)); (31b)
rb + l(x;m)f(k) = c + x; (31c)
bT   b = m(hT   h): (31d)
7We considered foreign aid which causes an increase in the subsidy rate of health investment; however, to
the best of our knowledge, such foreign aid does not exist in the sense that a foreign country determines the
relative price of investment commodities for health.
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where m(< 0) is the same as (< 0) in (23) except for the public policies. From (31a)-(31d),
we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4 A temporary rise in the foreign aid, m, improves the health-related quality
of life in the long run. Additionally, a permanent rise in the foreign aid improves the health-
related quality of life in the long run as well.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Comparing this proposition with Proposition 2, we can easily understand the reason
why the foreign aid improves the health-related quality of life. First, based on  = 0, let
us compare (26a) and (26b) with (31a) and (31b). Then, these equations are completely
the same each other. Thus, from (26b) and (31b), we can see @x=@m = @x=@ =  1, and
furthermore, substituting this result into (26a) or (31a) yields h = h(c) where @h=@c > 0.
Importantly, because of a crowding-out eect, an increase of one unit of direct transfer of
health investment causes a decrease of one unit of private health investment, meaning that
since the total amount of investment commodities (x +m) or (x + ) does not change, the
direct transfer of investment commodities does not have a direct impact on the health-related
quality of life. This conclusion is consistent irrespective of whether the policy is conducted
by the domestic government.
On the other hand, unlike the domestic policy, the foreign aid does not impose any burden
for the domestic government. That is, it can be easily presumed that the domestic residents
who are not imposed by any tax have more wealth to spare in the case of foreign aid, which
leads to a positive impact on private consumption. Concretely, considering that the growth
rate of private consumption is zero, we nd that the agent initially increases the level of his
consumption. That is, it holds c = c(m) where @c=m > 0.8 Finally, substituting c = c(m)
into h = h(c) yields h = h(c(m)) where @h=@m = @h

@c
@c
@m > 0. Intuitively, in contrast
to the investment subsidy in the last section, such a higher level of private consumption causes
the negative impact on the growth rate of private health investment in (11), which means
that the current investment is further stimulated. As a result, the eect causes a higher level
of health-related quality of life in the long run.
8In detail, see Appendix B.
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5.2 Non-separable utility function
Hashimoto and Tabata (2010) and Aisa and Pueyo (2013) introduce the non-separable utility
function with non-health-care and health-care goods in the multiplicative form. In other
words, when people consume health-care goods, consuming non-health-care goods leads to a
higher level of utility. For instance, suppose that health-care goods are medicine and non-
health-care goods are food. When people consume the health-care enough goods, the state of
their health will be largely improved, so that consuming the food leads to a higher satisfaction
because they can enjoy eating more, which would be reasonable as an extension of our paper.
Therefore, in this subsection we modify the utility function as follows:
U0 
Z 1
0
u(ct; ht)e
 tdt: (32)
Unlike (3) in the baseline model, we assume the non-separable utility function between the
consumption and the health-related quality of life where we assume that uch(ct; ht) has a
positive sign as in Hashimoto and Tabata (2010) and Aisa and Pueyo (2013).
Then, we can conclude that the main nding in the baseline model does not change.
To give the intuitive explanations, let us conrm the dynamic equation of private health
investment:9
(3): _xt =   g
0(xt + )
g00(xt + )

r   v
0(ht)g0(xt + )
(1  )q

; (33a)
(32): _xt =   g
0(xt + )
g00(xt + )

r   uh(c(ht; q); ht)g
0(xt + )
(1  )q

: (33b)
where uh = @u=@h. We must note that q is the shadow value for the budget constraint
(5), and its value is xed because   _q=q = r    = 0. For the convenience of intuitive
explanation, we make use of the shadow value in (33a) and (33b), not the marginal utility of
private consumption. Then, we can easily conrm that except for v0(ht) and uh(c(ht; q); ht),
both equations are the same, and furthermore importantly, in both equations it holds that
@ _xt=@q < 0. Since the dynamic equation of health-related quality of life in (4) is the same
irrespective of whether the utility function is separable or not, we can presume that the main
ndings of public policies are also the same.
9Concretely, we can maximize (32) subject to (4) and (5) as in the baseline model. Then, we can derive
(33b) from the similar procedure of derivation for (11)
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered the health-related quality of life and the agent's investment
behavior for health in the small open economy. In other words, we assumed that people
can invest in their health, and hence, their health-related quality of life can be improved.
Using the model, we found that the temporary changes of public policies (the investment
subsidy policy and the direct transfer of investment commodities) conducted by the domestic
government do not have positive impacts on the health-related quality of life in the long
run. Furthermore, this result does not change irrespective of whether the utility function is
separable between the consumption good and the health-related quality of life. On the other
hand, we found that a temporary increase in direct transfer of investment commodities from
a foreign country improves the health-related quality of life.
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Appendix A.
As for the temporary eects, we follow the procedure in Sen and Turnovsky (1990) and
Turnovsky (1997).
The eect of a temporary change in 
To simplify the exposition, we rst focus on the case where  6= 0 and  = 0. From
(26a)-(26d), each steady-state value is given as follows:
x = X(); X > 0; (A.1a)
h = H(c; ); Hc > 0; H > 0; (A.1b)
b = B(c; ); Bc > 0; B > 0; (A.1c)
c = C(; bT ; hT ); C < 0: (A.1d)
In what follows, we provide the explanation about the derivations of (A.1a)-(A.1d). Under
 = 0, it follows from (26b) that x = X(), where
X  @x

@
=
G0(l)l
g0(x) G0(l)lx > 0:
Furthermore, (26a), (26c), and x = X() yield
v0(h)g0(X()) = r(1  )u0(c);
rb + l(X(); )f(k)  c  X() = 0;
so that we obtain h = H(c; ) and b = B(c; ), where10
Hc  @h

@c
=
r(1  )u00(c)
v00(h)g0(x)
> 0 , H  @h

@
=  v
0(h)g00(x)X + ru0(c)
v00(h)g0(x)
> 0 ,
Bc  @b

@c
=
1
r
> 0 , B  @b

@
=  1
r
h
f(k)

lxX + l
	 Xi > 0 .
It follows from (26d), h = H(c; ), and b = B(c; ) that
B(c; )  bT =  

hT  H(c; )
	
:
This leads to c = C(; bT ; hT ), where11
C  @c

@
=   B  H
Bc  Hc < 0:
10The detailed derivations of H > 0 and B > 0 are available upon request.
11Employing Hc > 0, Bc > 0, and  < 0 yields Bc  Hc > 0. In addition, H > 0, B > 0, and  < 0
lead to B  H > 0. Thus, C < 0 holds.
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We now examine the eect of a change in  on the health-related quality of life in the
long run. The economy moves along the following unstable path under 0  t < T :
ht = h

1 +A1e
a1t +A2e
a2t;
where h1 = H(c1; 1) = H(C(1; b0; h0); 1). Under T  t, on the other hand, the economy
moves along the following stable path:
ht = h

2 +A
0
1e
a01t;
where h2 = H(c2; 0) = H(C(0; bT ; hT ); 0). Calculating h2   h1 and h1   h0, we obtain12
h2   h1  H(c2; 0) H(c1; 1) =  Hd; (A.2a)
h1   h0  H(c1; 1) H(c0; 0) = HcCd +Hd: (A.2b)
Taking Hc > 0 and C < 0 into account, we nd that the following expression holds from
(A.2a) and (A.2b):13
h2   h0 = HcCd < 0:
Therefore, the agent's health status gets worse in the new steady state when the value of 
temporarily rises.
The eect of a temporary change in 
We next move on to the case where  = 0 and  6= 0. From (26a)-(26d), each steady-state
value is given as follows:
x = X(); X < 0; (A.3a)
h = H(c; ); Hc > 0; H = 0; (A.3b)
b = B(c; ); Bc > 0; B = 0; (A.3c)
c = C(; bT ; hT ); C = 0: (A.3d)
In what follows, we explain about the derivations of (A.3a)-(A.3d). When  = 0, (26b) yields
x = X(), where
X  @x

@
=  g
0(x + ) G0(l)l
g0(x + ) G0(l)lx =  1 < 0; (* lx = l):
12We employ c1 = c

2.
13Note that d > 0.
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From (26a), (26c), and x = X(), we see that
v0(h)g0(X() + ) = ru0(c);
rb + l(X(); )f(k)  c  X()   = 0:
These expressions result in h = H(c; ) and b = B(c; ), where
Hc  @h

@c
=
ru00(c)
v00(h)g0(x + )
> 0 , H  @h

@
=  v
0(h)g00(x + )(X + 1)
v00(h)g0(x + )
= 0 ,
Bc  @b

@c
=
1
r
> 0 , B  @b

@
=  1
r
 
X + 1

lxf(k)  1
	
= 0 .
Note that we employ X =  1 regarding the derivations of H = 0 and B = 0. It follows
from (26d), h = H(c; ), and b = B(c; ) that
B(c; )  bT =  

hT  H(c; )
	
:
Solving this expression, we obtain c = C(; bT ; hT ), where
C  @c

@
=   B  H
Bc  Hc = 0 (* H = 0 and B = 0):
We now check the eect of a change in  on the health-related quality of life in the long
run. The economy moves along the following unstable path under 0  t < T :
ht = h

1 +A1e
a1t +A2e
a2t;
where h1 = H(c1; 1) = H(C(1; b0; h0); 1). Under T  t, on the other hand, the economy
moves along the following stable path:
ht = h

2 +A
0
1e
a01t;
where h2 = H(c2; 0) = H(C(0; bT ; hT ); 0). Calculating h2   h1 and h1   h0, we obtain14
h2   h1  H(c2; 0) H(c1; 1) =  Hd = 0;
h1   h0  H(c1; 1) H(c0; 0) = HcCd +Hd = 0;
because H = 0 and C = 0. Thus, we nd that the following expression holds:
h2   h0 = 0:
14We employ c1 = c

2. In addition, note that d > 0.
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Therefore, the agent's health status does not change in the new steady state when the value
of  temporarily rises.
Appendix B.
From (31a)-(31d), each steady-state value is given as follows after some manipulation:
x = X(m); Xm < 0; (B.1a)
h = H(c;m); Hc > 0; Hm = 0; (B.1b)
b = B(c;m); Bc > 0; Bm < 0; (B.1c)
c = C(m; bT ; hT ); Cm > 0: (B.1d)
Note that the signs of Xm, Hc , Hm, and Bc are obtained from the same calculations as
in Appendix B (replace  with m in each expression), whereas the signs of Bm and Cm are
given by
Bm  @b

@m
=  1
r
h 
Xm + 1

lxf(k)  1
	
+ 1
i
=  1
r
< 0 (* Xm =  1);
Cm  @c

@m
=  Bm  Hm
Bc  Hc =  
Bm
Bc  Hc > 0:
We now consider the eect of a temporary change in m on h. Taking the same analysis
as in Appendix A into consideration, we ultimately see that
h2   h1  H(c2;m0) H(c1;m1) =  Hmdm = 0;
h1   h0  H(c1;m1) H(c0;m0) = HcCmdm+Hmdm = HcCmdm > 0;
because Hm = 0, Hc > 0 and Cm > 0 (note that dm > 0). Thus, we nd that the following
expression holds:
h2   h0 = HcCmdm > 0:
Therefore, the agent's health status gets better in the new steady state when the value of m
temporarily rises.
We now examine the eect of a permanent change in a foreign aid on the health-related
quality of life in the long run. The permanent eect of a change in foreign aid on health
status is given by
dh
dm
= HcCm +Hm =
ru00(c)
v00(h)g0(x +m)  r2u00(c)m > 0:
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Thus, if a foreign aid increases, then the health-related quality of life improves. However,
since Hm = 0, an increase in a foreign aid does not lead to improvement of the health-related
quality of life directly. The indirect eect of a foreign aid on consumption ultimately raises
the health-related quality of life.
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Figure 1: The graph of the _xt = 0 locus and that of the _ht = 0 locus
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Figure 2: Phase diagram of the subsystem
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Figure 3: The eect of a rise in 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Figure 4: Temporary eect of a rise in 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Figure 5: Permanent eect of a rise in 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